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Articulation of Plural Values in Deliberative Monetary Valuation: 
Beyond Preference Economisation and Moralisation 
Alex Y. Lo1 and Clive L. Spash2 
Abstract 
The use of deliberative methods to assess environmental values in monetary terms has been 
motivated by the potential for small group discussion to help with preference formation and 
the inclusion of non-economic values. In this review, two broad approaches are identified: 
preference economisation and preference moralisation. The former is analytical, 
concentrates upon issues of poor respondent cognition and produces a narrow conception of 
value linked to utilitarianism. The latter emphasises political legitimacy, appeals to 
community values and tends to privilege arguments made in the public interest. Both 
approaches are shown to embrace forms of value convergence which undermine the 
prospects for value pluralism. As a result exclusion and predefinition of values dominates 
current practice. In order to maintain democratic credentials, the importance attributed to 
monetary value needs to be left as an open question to be addressed as part of a process 
determining an ‘agreement to pay’. To this end we identify a discourse-based approach as a 
third way consistent with the democratic and value plural potential of deliberative monetary 
valuation.
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1. Introduction 
Deliberative monetary valuation (DMV) combines economic and political processes to 
value the environment (Spash, 2007). Participating individuals form small groups to share 
information and raise concerns about a proposed environmental change. The procedure of 
quantifying environmental values in monetary terms is preceded by a dialogue or 
deliberation amongst the valuing agents. They are typically supported and guided by 
practitioners or researchers and given opportunities to discuss prior to stating a 
willingness-to-pay (WTP)1. The value obtained is meant to be of potential use in project 
appraisal, cost-benefit analysis or other formal decision processes. Design varies but 
deliberative sessions usually last one to two hours and may be repeated over several days. 
From the first theoretical discussions, in the 1990s, the method has attracted 
attention from a range of disciplinary experts. These have included not only economists 
(Jacobs, 1997), but also social psychologists (Brown et al., 1995), decision scientists 
(Gregory et al. 1993), applied philosophers (Sagoff, 1998), and political scientists (Ward, 
1999). As a result, different perspectives on what constitutes the aims of DMV has led to 
some strongly divergent practice. 
In general, DMV has developed as a response to problems associated with 
environmental value elicitation using stated preference methods; that is the contingent 
valuation method (CVM) and choice experiments. In technical terms, within environmental 
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economics, these problems are regarded as including lack of prior preferences and poor 
understanding of environmental change on the part of valuing agents. Group processes are 
expected to enable information sharing, provide opportunities for effective preference 
construction and even to overcome an individuals’ bounded rationality (Gregory and Slovic, 
1997). Participants are thus exposed to a variety of perspectives and value positions held by 
others. 
Increasingly, ecological economists have attempted to adopt the idea of public 
deliberation in seeking alternatives to the stated preference approaches and CBA (Spash et 
al., 2005; Spash and Vatn, 2006; Söderbaum and Brown, 2010). The aim has been to 
identify approaches for integrating diverse values and so improve public participation and 
representation in policy initiatives. This has lead to exploring the potential for a deliberative 
economics (Norgaard, 2007; Zografos and Howarth, 2008). From this perspective the 
problems which can potentially be addressed by DMV relate to the exclusion of 
non-utilitarian ethical systems (e.g., rights based thinking) and non-economic motives for 
valuing the environment (Spash 2000a, 2006). 
Promoting public reasoning, rather than individual preference satisfaction, as a basis 
for collective decisions raises the prospect of a transformative and moralising experience 
(Niemeyer and Spash, 2001; Spash, 2007). This shows DMV appealing to the political 
sciences and in particular the theory of deliberative democracy (Cohen, 1989; Dryzek, 1990; 
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Bohman, 1996; Gutmann and Thompson, 1996; Dryzek, 2000). That theory arose in the 
early 1990s leading to what has been called a ‘deliberative turn’ in democratic theory 
(Dryzek, 2000, p. 1). This has at its core the imperative of mutual justification of the 
positions held by those affected by a decision. Democratic legitimacy is sought by 
participation in an open, inclusive and reciprocal dialogue among free and equal citizens. 
Theoretical attempts to merge participatory deliberative methods with monetary 
valuation soon followed the deliberative turn (Jacobs, 1997; Sagoff, 1998). The body of 
literature has grown rapidly especially during the last few years (Howarth and Wilson, 2006; 
Macmillan et al., 2006; Urama and Hodge, 2006; Powe, 2007; Spash, 2007, Dietz et al., 
2009; Álvarez-Farizo et al., 2009; Ito et al., 2009). Unfortunately, the proliferation may be 
more of a deliberative ‘rush’. Some DMV applications have been criticised for engaging in 
rhetorical use of deliberative methods to repair and revalidate state preference methods to 
justify neoclassical economic approaches (Spash, 2008a; Jorgensen, 2009). However, 
building DMV upon the neoclassical tradition appears unpromising for reasons explored 
later in this paper. 
There are also doubts as to the appropriateness of the deliberative approaches in 
providing valid benefit estimates for economic analysis. Concerns are couched in terms of, 
to name a few, statistical representation and stability of response (Powe, 2007), failure to 
deal with trade-offs (Orr, 2007), and WTP question format (Aldred, 2005). DMV is also 
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questioned on normative grounds for unnecessarily reducing plural values into a single 
metric which invariably violates the incommensurability of ethical values2 (Vatn, 2005; 
O’Neill, 2007). In other words, the questions raised concern whether justifying DMV results 
as an economic value requires excessive qualification and manipulation of environmental 
values. An unresolved issue is then whether or not DMV can and should be seen as an 
economic tool. This then raises concerns about the purposes of DMV and the nature of 
monetary expressions. 
In addition, we show that some of the political arguments for DMV are equally 
fraught with contradictions. We attempt to substantiate the critique by elaborating on a 
larger body of literature in light of a theory of deliberative democracy. The results are, 
nevertheless, not to reject DMV completely, but redeem it by highlighting the deeper 
implications of appealing to deliberative democracy. 
The next section briefly provides the background and theoretical development of 
DMV. Section 3 introduces our categorisation of DMV into two approaches, namely, 
preference economisation and preference moralisation. The normative structures of these 
two approaches are then compared. Section 4 conducts a critical review calling on 
representative studies to bring out the perceived meanings of the valuation inquiry and 
elicited values. This raises the role of impartiality, utilitarianism and the crowding out of 
deliberative democratic principles. Section 5 turns to value pluralism in DMV and the 
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problems current DMV practice poses for its articulation. An alternative approach to DMV 
is then proposed in Section 6. This aims to avoid some of the identified pitfalls. The paper 
concludes by drawing implications for the emerging area of deliberative economics. 
 
2. From Disiciplinary Failure to Multidisciplinary Synthesis 
The development of DMV by multiple disciplines has contributed to variety in conceptual 
models. The variations can be broadly attributed to two widely discussed limitations of 
stated preference approaches to environmental valuation. These are based upon a debate 
held within economics and a more broadly defined critiques involving non-economists. 
First is a concern, we refer to as the internal critique, expressed by economists that 
individuals confront too difficult a task when being asked to value an environmental change 
in monetary terms during a relatively short interview or survey (e.g. 15 to 20 minutes). 
Typical arguments are the lack of time to reflect or engage in arbitrage (Macmillan et al., 
2002, 2006; Robinson et al., 2009) and respondents’ inadequate cognitive capacity to 
understand the welfare trade-offs being requested under such circumstances (Gregory and 
Slovic, 1997; McDaniels et al., 2003). Individuals who are then classified as giving 
‘irrational’ responses, as a consequence, are regarded as falling short of the standard 
economic assumptions underpinning stated preference approaches. Bateman et al. (2008, p. 
139) propose that these individuals need to gain repetitive experience of the ‘operating rules 
 7
of the contingent market’ through a ‘learning design contingent valuation’ to elicit 
theoretically consistent values. Among practitioners expressing such positions there is a 
belief that people should behave more economically, i.e. as homo economicus. 
Second is what we term the external critique. This is a concern by both economists and 
non-economists that stated preference approaches restrict the type of values which an 
individual is able to express. For example, respondents may be forced to act as consumers 
rather than citizens (Sagoff, 1988), or those adopting rights-based rationales may be treated 
as protestors or expressing irrational lexicographic preferences (Spash, 2000b, 2008b). 
Under this critique, stated preference approaches are criticised for overlooking concerns 
about procedural justice, non-utilitarian ethics and the role of social norms, because they are 
built upon the assumption of monetary commensurability (Jorgensen et al., 2001; Spash et 
al., 2009). Standard economic assumptions then fail to properly capture the values held by 
individuals concerning a collective choice about the environment. There is a belief amongst 
DMV advocates expressing such positions that economics should embrace plural values or 
be qualified by alternative values. 
Thus DMV is being justified in two contrasting ways: one questioning the capacity of 
individuals, and the other questioning the economic frame. Those practitioners who put 
more weight on people’s limited cognitive abilities tend to run DMV as a tutorial or 
educational workshop to improve the face validity of their results. Those who regard values 
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as being excluded emphasise institutional design, procedural fairness and the articulation of 
alternative ethical basis for values. This is not necessarily a sharp dichotomy and as will be 
shown in Section 3 there are some shared basic perspectives. However, we believe the 
distinction is insightful and helps understanding of the literature. 
This distinction is additional and complementary to the process based value 
classification of DMV studies, shown in Table 1, presented by Spash (2007, 2008a). Spash 
explains social value under standard stated preference techniques as typically being 
calculated by asking individually focused valuation questions of respondents, who decide as 
individuals. A DMV exercise designed to address the internal critique has no need to 
withdraw from this methodologically individualistic economic frame and the procedure of 
individual preference aggregation as representing social value. However, the group process 
involved is argued to make individual values into charitable contributions. Methodological 
individualism could also be maintained while deriving an aggregate value or an expressed 
social WTP/WTA directly from valuing agents; although the result would diverge from 
economic welfare surplus measures. 
In contrast, a DMV addressing the external critique is likely to appeal to group 
procedures and break with strict methodological individualism. Influenced by the idea of 
deliberative democracy, the process requires that individuals openly communicate with each 
other. Standard stated preference practice is called into doubt and replaced by participatory 
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procedures which include group decision-making. This leads to either a fair price or an 
arbitrated social WTP/WTA, depending upon whether the value produced is at an aggregate 
or individual level. This variety in problem definition allows a clear distinction to be drawn 
in terms of the WTP category favoured by different DMV advocates, see Spash (2008a). 
 
Table 1  Forms of value expression in DMV 
 
Terms in which WTP specified 
 Individual  
(disaggregated value) 
Social  
(aggregative value) 
Value provider   
Individual in a group 
setting 
Charitable contribution Expressed social WTP/WTA 
Group Fair price Arbitrated social WTP/WTA 
Source: Spash (2007, 2008a) 
 
However, the earlier theoretical explorations of DMV fail to make such clear 
distinctions. In fact, some seek to synthesise different intellectual traditions to establish an 
aggregative enterprise. Wilson and Howarth (2002, p. 432), for example, see DMV as a 
unifying project and suggest that it is ‘derived from a convergence of arguments from 
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economics, social psychology, decision science, and political theory’. Yet the competing 
conceptions about the role of the valuing agents (the public or stakeholders) and the inquirer 
(scientists or social scientists) are not explored. This neglects the conflict between the 
traditional classification of economics and psychology as conducting a scientific discourse, 
whereas politics and ethics are regarded as normative. The former tends to presume the 
individual to be an object for scientific study, the latter regards the individual as a 
self-defining subject within a social process. The interdisciplinary cooperation required is 
far from straightforward. Economics has an essentially static model of human behaviour 
based upon the assumption that an individual has both pre-existing preferences and perfect 
information; they act as rational utility maximising agents. Social psychology has a process 
model where the emphasis is upon how beliefs and attitudes are formed or learnt and how 
information is acquired; agents are complex and fallible. 
Another problem is the questionable assertion that public deliberation, being a political 
activity, is inherently conducive to value pluralism, because individuals are exposed to a 
wide range of viewpoints (Jacobs, 1997; Howarth and Wilson, 2006; Vatn, 2009). A 
pluralistic process certainly recognizes and seeks to maintain multiple ways of valuing in 
contrast to the monism of neoclassical economics. However, monism is not absent from 
political theory or philosophy. Some deliberative democrats are then open to criticism for 
advancing a narrow conception of value (see Dryzek, 2000) and organising participatory 
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processes that unduly close-down alternatives (Stirling, 2006). History has shown that 
participatory engagement does not guarantee value pluralism or tolerance of alternative 
viewpoints. 
The literature on DMV can then be explained in terms of two key aspects. First, there 
are distinct and contrasting approaches arising from those primarily concerned with internal 
critiques as opposed to those preoccupied with external critiques. Second, there are identical 
underlying methodological problems facing both because of some shared theoretical 
positions. We first further explain the distinction between contrasting approaches before 
analysing the literature in terms of common organising principles. 
 
3. Two Contrasting Approaches Seeking Value Convergence 
3.1 Preference Economisation 
Decision scientists and some environmental economists favour an analytical form of 
deliberation which leads to preference construction in accordance with neoclassical 
economic theory. The primary objective of DMV is then to ease respondents’ cognitive 
burdens. Adequate information and time to think and discuss are provided to tackle what are 
regarded as the problems arising from individuals’ limited imaginations and calculating 
abilities. The behavioural psychological literature is called upon to support the case that 
individuals do not hold informed, stable and pre-existing preferences (Peterson et al., 1988; 
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Kahneman and Knetsch, 1992; Kahneman et al., 1999), and often fail to meaningfully 
express their entangled values (Gregory et al., 1993; Gregory and Slovic, 1997). 
Environmental valuation can then be seen as an excessively demanding task. Protest and 
‘irrational’ responses are explained in terms of cognition problems resolvable by preference 
engineering (Gregory et al., 2005; Hanley and Shogren, 2005; Bateman et al., 2008). 
Practitioners then aim to implement a process whereby preferences are clarified, constructed 
and articulated in a cognitively rational manner. Strictly structured, informative group 
discussion is then regarded as a method for lessening the impact of impediments to WTP 
elicitation, such as bounded rationality. 
The underlying diagnosis makes no philosophical arguments. Full commitment to this 
scientific-behavioural view protects some fundamental economic principles, including value 
monism. DMV is then devised to ensure rational choice by correcting ill-constructed 
preferences and embedding value articulation in orthodox economic logic. 
Respondents may, for example, be guided through a structured thinking process 
designed in accordance with multi-attribute utility theory (MAUT) (Gregory et al., 1993; 
Gregory, 2000; Gregory and Wellman, 2001). Under this formulation, valuing agents 
express their preferences for each attribute by assigning weights. The results can then be 
used as a basis for translating environmental values into equivalent money terms. 
Another stream of thought simply supplements stated preference approaches with 
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additional information, time, opportunities to share knowledge, and occasionally a 
citizen-type frame of reference (Macmillan et al., 2002; Robinson, 2002; Philip and 
MacMillan, 2005; Álvarez-Farizo and Hanley, 2006; Macmillan et al., 2006; Urama and 
Hodge, 2006; Álvarez-Farizoa et al., 2007; Lienhoop and MacMillan, 2007; Álvarez-Farizo 
et al., 2009; Robinson et al., 2009). A modified exchange value is intended, and deliberative 
engagement is minimal. However, the process actually produces charitable contributions 
rather than economic welfare measures (Spash, 2008a). This divergence is neglected 
because of the way in which the valuation problem is framed as improving stated preference 
validity. 
Cognitive issues are considered as central to this preference construction approach. 
The starting point is the individuals’ inability to articulate values in monetary terms, rather 
than inherent incommensurability. ‘Irrational’ behaviours commonly documented in 
valuation studies are relegated to a first-party problem, i.e. it is the individuals who fail. 
Uninformed respondents need professional guidance to clarify values and this is supported 
by additional information and time for thinking. Moral dispute over values is irrelevant or 
unimportant because everything is assumed to be reducible to some form of cognitive 
difficulty. There is no need to subvert the economic frame; only better science is needed, i.e. 
decision analysis and consistency with economic theory.  
Valuing agents cannot then be left to themselves. For example, Gregory and associates 
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are highly sceptical of unaided value articulation3. They offer a strictly structured approach 
involving re-engineering of the valuing agents’ mind in accordance with a given evaluative 
model (Gregory, 2000; Gregory and Slovic, 1997; Gregory et al., 1993; McDaniels et al., 
2003). The evaluation tasks are designed to streamline personal heuristic reflection 
supported by group discussion. The process mimics what is regarded as a ‘natural’ human 
thought process in order to enable participants to think rationally about their objectives and 
the benefits and consequences associated with alternatives. Environmental disputes are 
believed to arise from ‘differences in the believability or interpretation of facts’ rather than 
underlying values (Gregory, 2000, p. 157). The evaluation is thus concentrated on 
clarification of facts and evidence. This requires that the values expressed must demonstrate 
an ‘evidential basis’ (Failing et al., 2007). The DMV group discussion then revolves around 
various functional, fact-based value dimensions constructed for explicit comparison of 
benefits and costs (Gregory, 2000; McDaniels et al., 2003). Subjective values must be 
properly articulated, using an objective scale, to be considered in the process. 
Moreover, values are assumed to be quantifiable and substitutable which allows their 
translation into money values. Gregory (2000) and Gregory and Slovic (1997) suggest that 
the perceived importance of, say, preservation of old-growth forests, can be measured by the 
respondents assigning ‘value points’ to critical habitat. Value points are also assigned to a 
specified amount of money. This allows translation of the value points attached to forest 
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preservation into money. The procedure operates under the assumptions that the valued 
items are divisible, without affecting their perceived importance, and the values attached to 
them are commensurable. The difficulty is that some moral and cultural values are limited 
to qualitative forms of expression like social actions or narratives. The procedure of 
quantification and translation via a common unit reifies subjective values in a controlled 
setting that is far from the contexts where they generate meaning. This comparative 
framework is itself a kind of value, typically embodying an assumption that all evaluative 
dimensions are subject to utilitarian trade-offs (Stirling, 2006). It threatens to twist the 
original forms of value expression in favour of its own framing. Comparing values on a 
scale which is by design favourable to one specific value perspective is unjustifiable from a 
deliberative democratic point of view. 
Some DMV practitioners are preoccupied with various orthodox economic 
perspectives (Alvarez-Farizo et al., 2007; Urama and Hodge, 2006; Alvarez-Farizo et al., 
2009; Alvarez-Farizo and Hanley, 2006; Macmillan et al., 2002). Their purpose in 
conducting DMV is stated as achieving a more robust exchange value. In most cases, the 
core valuation tasks are framed as a consumer-type decision-making process. One obvious 
outcome is arbitrary exclusion of protest responses. Such protests include those classified as 
failing to genuinely consider the required economic trade-offs, presumably because these 
confound the standard economic explanations (Spash, 2008a). A consumer frame is also 
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sustained by Gregory (2000) who explicitly asked the participants to think about a market 
analogy (car purchase) as a demonstration example. 
The valuation attempts of various economic practitioners are oriented to an 
information-deficit model. Robinson (2002, p. 97) employs a citizens’ jury to address the 
‘problems of information bias’ observed in conventional valuation studies. Likewise, Urama 
and Hodge (2006) are satisfied with their educational participatory workshop for 
overcoming the ‘challenge’ of information provision. The rhetoric bears some resemblance 
to Gregory’s strategy of easing human’s cognitive burdens by making information provision 
and learning more efficient. The whole DMV experiment is then designed to feed the 
valuing agents with adequate information and encourage personal reflection on a set of 
researcher/practitioner selected facts. The role of group discussion is trivial – helping 
participants ‘to learn what they want to know’ for making rational decisions (Macmillan et 
al., 2002, p. 57). The processes are then in line with Gregory et al.’s (1993) suggested 
student tutorial analogy and Bateman et al.’s (2008) ‘learning design contingent valuation’. 
The economic preference construction approach emphasises value elicitation at the 
individual level. Group discussion supports individuals in making their choice rather than 
the other way round. This approach seeks to induce instrumental rationality by focusing 
participants on the possible practical consequences of their prospective choice, and enforce 
an intra-personal integration of values by making individuals more conscious and informed 
 17
of the relevant knowledge relating to that choice. Furthermore, Gregory’s analytic approach 
is sceptical of citizen empowerment; it appears somewhat manipulative and far from the 
deliberative democratic model. Potential for debate on fundamental values is minimal. 
Public values are sought from the focused thinking on public interests, but the desire is for 
deliberative WTP in terms of a neoclassical economic construct. This approach nurtures 
rational economic men. 
 
3.2 Preference Moralisation  
DMV theorists from a wide range of disciplines identify the principal problems of 
environmental valuation as inadequate opportunities for expressing values and inappropriate 
attention to non-economic considerations, including social norms, rights and procedural 
fairness (Vatn and Bromley, 1994; Clark et al., 2000; Jorgensen et al., 2001; O'Neill, 2007; 
Spash et al., 2009). Various attempts have been made to draw on political theories to 
establish more ethical, open and fairer value-articulating institutions (VAIs) (O’Hara, 1996; 
O'Neill, 2007; Douai, 2009; Vatn, 2009). Of particular interest to this group has been the 
theory of deliberative democracy rooted in Habermas’s discourse ethics and other political 
traditions (Cohen, 1989; Bohman, 1996; Bohman and Rehg, 1997; Dryzek, 2000). The 
theory entails exchange between competing discourses through authentic communication 
among free and equal citizens in a non-coercive fashion (Dryzek, 1990, 2000, 2011). 
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Citizens must equip their value claims with reasons and justify these to others in the search 
for fair terms of social cooperation. Political legitimacy is sought from justification to and 
reasoned acceptance by those who will have to live with the outcome. Reciprocal 
understanding is regarded as key to producing fair outcomes. 
Preference moralisation follows this tradition by giving more credence to legitimacy 
issues, civic engagement, and social learning (Brown et al., 1995; Jacobs, 1997; Sagoff, 
1998; Ward, 1999; Niemeyer and Spash, 2001; Wilson and Howarth, 2002; James and 
Blamey, 2005; Howarth and Wilson, 2006; Spash, 2007, 2008a). A social process is 
constructed in which participants bring forth a variety of perspectives, and debate and 
reflect upon their preferences. There is a strong emphasis on the interactive aspects. 
Participants are expected to exercise the virtue of reciprocity and appeal to the ‘force of the 
better arguments’ in a group process aiming for consensual outcomes. This approach 
actively pursues collective reflection on public interests beyond personal considerations.  
Participants are typically given more freedom in agenda setting and calling expert 
witness than under preference economisation. After hearing expert presentations and 
discussions, participants provide a WTP estimate in the form of a value for society or 
individual contribution. In either case, some form of group agreement is required, although 
minority positions are not excluded a priori. In general aggregated values are sought leading 
to an arbitrated social WTP/WTA (see Table 1). A democratic process, and not merely an 
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economic estimation, is sought. 
Value convergence under preference moralisation is couched in terms of public 
interest (e.g., Brown et al. 1995; Sagoff, 1998; Ward, 1999; Wilson and Howarth, 2002). 
There is a thread of argument that deliberation should be limited to we-perspectives (Vatn, 
2005, p. 360-361). Sagoff (1998) argues against the usual practice that environmental 
valuation experiments are designed to elicit consumer preference based on I-perspectives. 
Instead, ‘a deliberative, discursive, jury-like research method emphasising informed 
discussion leading toward a consensus based on an argument about the public interest’ is 
recommended (Sagoff, 1998, p. 213). In such a context, valuing agents might be asked to 
deliberate without emphasising the individual welfare effects. Sagoff (1998), however, has 
ignored the fact that individuals often play the dual role of citizens and consumers 
simultaneously. Such a distinction is unrealistic and unnecessary. The I and We are often, if 
not always, integrally linked. The attempt to enforce We perspectives then runs into 
problems. 
In this regard, consider Brown et al.’s (1995) proposal in which representation of 
private or partial interests is completely excluded. The ‘overriding objective’ of their jury 
selection procedure is to avoid including those who have ‘compelling personal interest’: ‘If 
a potential jurist’s personal interest in the outcome is such that he or she is not likely to be 
willing or able to see and fairly consider the collective good, that person should be 
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excluded.’ (Brown et al., 1995, p. 256)  Since all the jurors are required to act as society’s 
representatives and set aside personal interests, such a strategy can quickly become 
reason-blind. That is, the basis for personal reasoning is lost. 
Ward (1999) generally follows the same line when prohibiting personal evaluations in 
a citizens’ jury: ‘Jurors are not asked to express their personal evaluations but their 
judgements about what environment quality is worth to society as a whole.’ (Ward, 1999, p. 
79)  Despite this, he then asks people to defend their personal evaluations and states that in 
a properly functioning citizens’ jury: ‘jurors would be forced to defend their personal 
evaluations because others would use these as evidence for making their own collective 
evaluations under extended sympathy.’ (Ward, 1999, p. 91)  The first statement renders the 
second logically redundant; if a participant is not allowed to express their personal 
evaluation there would be no reason to defend it. Elsewhere in the paper Ward (1999) 
accepts that participants appeal to personal childhood memory when deliberating on 
heathland preservation. Unfortunately he then again contradicts himself by suggesting that 
participants should not be asked to express what the environment is worth to them as 
individuals (Ward, 1999, p. 91). Such authors appear to hold a highly ambiguous position 
with regard to the program of addressing value articulation by members of the public. 
Wilson and Howarth (2002, p. 436) too suggest that participants should be encouraged 
not to ‘take a narrow or group-interested standpoint’, quoted from Rawls (1971, p. 360). 
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These authors are inattentive to the inconsistency between the Rawlsian contractarian 
approach and the different tradition of discursive democracy (a different but major strand of 
deliberative democracy theory; see Dryzek, 1990). Espousing Rawls’s ideal the ‘original 
position’, which promises uniform values, undermines the capacity of DMV to maintain 
value plurality (Spash, 2007). 
The general aim of those advocating a preference moralisation approach is for 
consensus (Sagoff, 1998; Ward, 1999; Wilson and Howarth, 2002; Howarth and Wilson, 
2006). They consider appeals to public interest as a means of overcoming differences 
between multiple comprehensive doctrines. Seeking consensus in the light of public interest 
is to seek moral support from a shared tradition that is assumed to be acceptable by all 
parties involved. The feasibility of reaching consensus is justified by assumption. 
However, moral disagreement often arises from precisely the absence of a shared 
tradition. People subscribe to different ethical views and live in different traditions, 
sometimes simultaneously, i.e. act as both a consumer and citizen. This partially contributes 
to the incommensurability problems confronting stated preference approaches. To ask all 
people to stop thinking as consumers is to silence that conflict altogether. That is, to impose 
such public-interest frames might unrealistically remove the fundamental conditions of 
moral disagreement that deliberation is designed to address. Consumer-type respondents 
may still reasonably protest against the citizen frame. Silencing conflict cannot make a 
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valuation theory free from the dilemma, irrespective of the type of values crowded out. 
 
4. Problematic Organising Principles: Impartiality and Utilitarianism 
Deliberative democracy affirms the role of mutual justification in pluralistic societies. 
Citizens are required to justify their value claims to the affected others to their reflective and 
reasonable acceptance. This demands that proposed value claims be, at least in theory, 
‘rejectable’ on their merits. Such a position is challenged both by the impartialist 
perspective common amongst preference moralisation approaches and the prevalence of 
utilitarianism common to both this and preference economisation approaches.  
 
4.1 Impartiality  
Impartialist perspectives claim to be universally justifiable, entailing demonstration rather 
than justification. Impartiality demands that reasons given by deliberating individuals be 
acceptable to anyone who is similarly situated in morally relevant respects. Impartiality 
differs from reciprocity because it ‘demands that reasons be impersonal, requiring citizens 
to suppress or disregard their partial perspectives and individual projects’ (Gutmann and 
Thompson, 1996, p. 54). That is, 
Impartialists can recognize the existence of moral disagreement…but they regard it 
as a sign that moral reasoning has failed. At least one of the reasoners has erred, one 
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or more have not carried the reasoning far enough, or else the problem itself is 
beyond the capacity of mortals to resolve. In the face of disagreement, impartiality 
tells us to choose the morally correct view and demonstrate its correctness to our 
fellow citizens, who, if they are rational, should accept it. (Gutmann and Thompson, 
1996, p. 59) 
Deliberating citizens must give reasons that would be justifiable from an impersonal 
perspective. The goal of this process is to establish a comprehensive moral view applicable 
to all. Other citizens are then bound to accept value claims as reasonable so long as they 
meet the moral doctrine. The function of deliberation then becomes demonstrating 
conformity of citizens to the moral doctrine. There is no requirement for mutual justification 
or debate. 
The impartial stance is common to the approaches falling under preference 
moralisation. For example, consider Brown et al.’s (1995) participant selection strategy. 
They link Harsanyi’s impartiality to Rawls’s (1971) ‘original position’, and argue for 
selecting participants who are capable of acting as agents of the larger public. In their ‘value 
jury’, facts are preceded by values as a deliberative focus. The recommended selection 
criteria include being: free from significant personal conflict of interest, willing and able to 
understand the issues and consider them objectively; in possession of an adequate level of 
maturity, intelligence and education (Brown et al., 1995, p. 255-6). These criteria, however, 
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prove to be excessively demanding. Logically, they exclude lay citizens and many who 
would be affected by a decision. 
The observation that Brown et al.’s (1995) value jury approach is ‘firmly rooted in the 
principles of discursive democracy’ (Howarth and Wilson, 2006, p. 8) is unwarranted. For 
their recommended jury selection strategy and the philosophy behind, it actually bears more 
resemblance to the Rawlsian approach than discursive democracy (see Dryzek, 1990, p. 43; 
Dryzek and Niemeyer, 2008). Similarly, Howarth and Wilson (2006) appreciate Gregory’s 
(2000) deliberative strategies, but Gregory’s analytic approach is qualitatively different 
from, and at times competing with, its deliberative-democratic counterpart (Lo, 
forthcoming). The former is characterized by an expert culture and technocratic orientation, 
and therefore cannot survive some key democratic imperatives such as participant 
empowerment. 
Howarth and Wilson (2006) attempt to demonstrate cross-disciplinary relevance, but 
have made some premature claims. They draw on Dryzek’s (1990, 2000) discursive 
democracy, which emphasises contestation of discourse and condemns 
hierarchy—following the tradition of critical theory. However, their deliberative ideal of 
‘aggregation by mutual consent’ appeals to the normative model of liberal democracy 
advocated by, among others, John Rawls. The Rawlsian approach is hinged on a set of 
‘superior’ political ideals functioning as a singular conception of values; acceptance of 
 25
which would weaken the moral need of actual deliberation by citizens (Dryzek, 2000; 
Bohman, 1996). This means their DMV model diverges from the critical strand, which 
challenges the idea of impartialist pre-accepted universal appeal (Dryzek, 2000).  
 
4.1 The Prevalence of Utilitarianism in DMV 
Utilitarianism appears in the context of DMV as a common moral doctrine which is a 
specific form of the imposition of impartiality. It clearly underlies the value system of those 
analysts who are strongly committed to meeting pragmatic policy needs. Those practitioners 
theoretically grounded in decision science attempt to make valuing agents thoroughly think 
through each key dimension of an issue and systematically construct and express their 
values. Gregory and associates have applied the MAUT to a group CVM process (Gregory 
et al., 1993; Gregory, 2000). The outputs are mathematically combined to form a summary 
measure. The final calculation is based on ‘expected utility’ and a single utilitarian value 
structure is embraced. As Gregory et al. (1993, p. 188) state: 
The eventual goal is to find a single hierarchy of values that all the shareholders can 
agree is complete. The values hierarchy must also be built with due concern for the 
form of the utility combination rule. 
The nature of values as perceived by these decision scientists can be traced back to the 
value-focused model sketched by Keeney (1992), in which values are understood as ‘what 
we want’. 
The philosophy of utilitarianism can also be found in Gowdy and Parks (forthcoming), 
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who argue that deliberative valuation is consistent with findings from contemporary welfare 
economics. A contribution of research into group processes, as they see it, is to ascertain 
situations that give humans utility. They conclude that individuals are the best judges of 
what is best for themselves and endorse Bentham’s utilitarian principle of the ‘greatest good 
for the greatest number’ as a basis of public policy-making. The theory seems at odds with 
the principles of mutual justification (which seeks approval from other citizens) and 
granting minority voices equal deliberative status. 
Then there is the proposal by Ward (1999) which is explicitly stated to be based on 
Harsanyi’s utilitarianism. His normative ideal requires that individuals put themselves into 
others’ shoes, extending their sympathy to others’ interests. So long as a natural entity has 
interests that people would empathize with, a utility function can be ascribed to it. Such 
utility functions ‘reflect the idea that it best serves interests if expected utility is maximized’ 
(Ward, 1999, p. 90). Those interests admitted to citizen deliberation must be impersonal, as 
indicated by the preference for citizens to engage in the ‘norms of impartial debate’ (Ward, 
1999, p. 79). 
Howarth and Wilson (2006, p. 11) define the deliberative groups’ maximum WTP for 
increased environmental quality as ‘the level of W [group payment] for which the group 
would be indifferent between implementing the proposed project and maintaining the status 
quo’. They note that the WTP is based on a standard utility function that summarizes 
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preferences, beliefs and moral judgments and is not limited to a person’s individual 
well-being or consumer preferences. Yet this does not preclude them from linking it to a 
maximization rule. Public deliberation is envisaged as a ‘fair negotiating’ process in which 
individuals engage in a search for maximisation of group well-being. 
Other DMV preference construction practitioners place a strong emphasis on the 
psychology of information processing, while operating under a preference utilitarian 
framework. Some are keen to deny or hide the validity of non-utilitarian responses which 
are commonly found in conventional CVM studies (Spash, 2008a). Álvarez-Farize et al. 
(2007, 2009), for example, seek the ‘committed value of a citizen’ but are reluctant to give 
credit to rights-based dimensions, probably because this would cast doubt on their favoured 
utilitarian framework. Such perspectives are remainder to being ‘things’ which fall under 
the valuers’ economic preference in an undefined way. Thus, they state: ‘the willingness to 
pay will not only include those things that favour individuals, but also those that favour the 
community’ (Alvarez-Farize et al., 2009, p. 790). 
The ‘market stall’ approach adopted by Macmillan et al. (2002, 2006), Philip and 
Macmillan (2005) and Lienhoop and Macmillan (2007) is designed to lead people to think 
like consumers making purchase decisions in real markets. This approach is not called 
citizens’ juries because, as Macmillan et al. (2002) explain, it attempts to combine (only) the 
‘desirable features’ of citizens’ juries—presumably referring to the opportunities of 
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discussion and information sharing—with economic valuation. Non-economic 
considerations are precluded by removing the ‘undesirable’ features. 
Deliberatively elicited monetary values are interpreted by James and Blamey (2005) 
with a welfare-economic framework. While these authors are sympathetic to the idea of 
deliberative democracy, they pursue an ‘economic interpretation’ of the elicited values in 
terms of a social welfare function and social optimality. Although they consider a 
citizen-type frame of reference more appropriate than a consumer one, it was relinquished 
to a ‘purchase model typically assumed in environmental economics’, in order to make the 
WTP estimates compatible with traditional cost-benefit analysis (James and Blamey, 2005, 
p. 238). Yet this does not preclude them from suggesting that a citizen perspective was 
sustained. 
Deliberative democracy does not exclude utilitarian calculation. However, if 
individuals holding diverse values are presumed and/or encouraged to follow a single 
comprehensive ethic (e.g. utility maximization), what is the point of debating values?  
Ensuring procedural openness and a cognitively sound decision structure does not change 
the fact that DMV remains a kind of economic valuation and as such reduces plural values 
into a single metric, i.e. money. Ethical considerations are compressed and non-economic 
values are forced into the economic frame or excluded, with little room left for concepts 
such as inviolable rights. Indeed, critics contend that there is no hope for the endeavour of 
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rights and equity so long as a money value is assigned. For example, Vatn (2005, p. 361) 
points out that DMV is based on a contradiction, because: 
It mixes collective reasoning and consensus building over principles and norms with 
individual trade-off calculations. It combines a VAI based on capturing 
incommensurability with one that is focused on commensurability. It mixes a VAI 
directed towards the ‘We’ with one based on an ‘I’ perspective. 
Such scepticism seems warranted. However, the issue here is not I versus We perspectives 
but rather the imposition of impartiality and the prevalence of a utilitarian philosophy 
underlying DMV. 
 
4.3 Crowding out deliberative democracy 
Utilitarianism offers a single inclusive end as the proper home to all moral claims. Taken as 
sovereign, it violates the principle of reciprocity by forcing citizens into a single hierarchy 
that they might not accept on a reciprocal basis. The adoption of utility maximization 
challenges the pursuit of a deliberatively democratic state. Maximizing aggregate 
well-being leads to a neglect of partial and minority interest positions for which a reciprocal 
perspective must make room (Gutmann and Thompson, 1996). Such interests, however 
reasonable, are always marginalized by the maximization rule. This means the imperative of 
reason-giving fails to function properly. If a deliberative group is designated to make a 
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decision that would guarantee a maximum social utility, participants would only need 
adequate supply of information and a process of corroboration, not reasoned debate. The 
moral role of DMV would be reduced to a pedagogical one emphasizing information 
exchange and clarification. 
Hence Dryzek (2000) attacks Rawls’s (1997) theory of public reason on the grounds 
that it could be undertaken by a solitary thinker, so that there is no need for actual 
deliberation. Arguments that must be couched in terms potentially acceptable to all citizens 
require only personal reflection—setting aside material self-interest and self-reflective 
weighing-up of arguments. Accordingly, the best individuals to exercise public reason 
would not be ordinary citizens, but intellectual elites. The participant selection strategy 
recommended by Brown et al. (1995) would undermine the moral need for citizens to 
deliberate. As the logic goes, the best combination of deliberators would consist of, say, 
philosophers, economists, scientists, judges, etc. Those lay citizens who have to live with 
the decision made would be excluded. This unambiguously violates the basic principles of 
deliberative democracy.  
Group deliberation is needed to introduce reasons that do not inherently possess 
universal appeal and to expose them to the possibility of being reasonably rejected. Unlike 
impartiality, the principle of reciprocity does not categorically exclude partial interests and 
so necessitates actual deliberation.  
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Those who deliberately insert a specific preconception of public interest into their 
model are trapped in the same problem as the Rawlsian public reason which seeks potential 
acceptance from all members of society in light of liberal values. Since the reason is 
singular, it is destined towards a particular end wherever it is exercised; no interactive 
process is necessary to enable it to produce its conclusions (Dryzek, 2000). Thus James and 
Blamey (2005) correctly point out that if the participants act fully as citizens operating 
behind the Rawlsian veil of ignorance, and have perfect knowledge of relevant 
circumstances, limited representativeness would no longer be a problem. More precisely, in 
such a case authentic representation of idiosyncratic perspectives would indeed be 
meaningless, because all participants are bound to relinquish their specific concerns to an 
impartial stance. Although participants may discuss which sets of public interest to be 
accepted, downplaying partial interests by design would undermine the arguments for 
invoking communicative reasoning. 
The Rawlsian public reason is something that citizens must adopt before debate 
(Dryzek, 2000). Yet, Wilson and Howarth suggest that the most appropriate 
value-articulating methodology is one that mirrors the Rawlsian ‘procedurally based public 
forum in which people are brought together to debate before making value judgments’ 
(Wilson and Howarth, 2002, p. 434, emphasis added). This view ignores the fact that value 
debate is of little necessity if the reason has been endorsed as an overriding frame of 
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reference. Authentic communication on a universally justifiable moral end is redundant as 
the reason sought is exogenous to it. 
Debate is also excluded under an orthodox MAUT approach which replaces 
multi-criteria with a mono-criterion (Munda, 1995). Like neoclassical economics, it cannot 
succeed without ‘tacitly asserting an individual dominant perspective and performance data 
set’ (Stirling, 1997, p. 194). Not surprising, Gregory and associates see little need for a 
philosophical debate on the part of deliberating individuals, while alleging to democratise 
environmental assessment (Lo, forthcoming). Group discussion is assigned a supplementary 
role, serving to raise participants’ comfort and pool different evaluative judgements 
(McDaniels et al., 2003). Clarification of values, rather than justification, is the true purpose. 
This approach targets individuals’ cognitive failure, requires the use of impersonal 
expressions of values and regards demonstration of benefits and costs as key. Thus, it fits 
squarely with the notion of impartiality. The whole project could be satisfactorily 
undertaken without actual discussion. 
Any democratic principle predicated upon a preoccupied singular conception of values 
cannot be sustained in light of deliberative democracy. Deliberative valuation predisposed 
toward a utilitarian frame is then indefensible. Couched in such terms, it would only result 
in a distorted notion of value pluralism. 
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5. Value Pluralism 
What the literature reviewed has shown is that the preoccupations of researcher/practitioner 
might lead to excessive intervention in the deliberative processes or even manipulation of 
outcomes (whether intended or unintended). Under both preference economisation and 
moralisation approaches, individuals are either required to strengthen their economic beliefs 
or convert their perspective toward a particular moral end. The proposed experimental 
controls appear to violate the requirements for value pluralism and multiple value 
expression. An alternative conceptualization is then needed. 
 
5.1 Expert Prejudgement and Bounded Reasoning 
The foregoing DMV models raise the prospect for value pluralism but resort to an accepted 
ethical tradition. Deliberation of this sort is subject to restrictions on reasoning. The 
prospects for value pluralism are questionable if researchers deliberately downplay some 
reasons by design or force those not normally used in a given context into the deliberative 
forum. Worse is that some of the methodological preoccupations, such as ‘no personal 
interest’, should be (but are not) open to debate—as one of the candidate reasons. Research 
designs shape values as they are built upon some philosophical foundations. Debating 
values and beliefs but protecting the researchers’ own from challenge is indefensible from a 
deliberative democratic viewpoint. This leaves the project of facilitating reasoned pluralism 
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undefined and undefended. 
Economic preference construction strives to induce instrumental reasoning and 
removes attention from the need to reason. Cognitive failure amongst valuing agents is 
taken as the ultimate, overriding reason justifying the professionally aided deliberation. 
Other incompatible value positions have to be compromised to be considered. Firmly 
holding to the exclusively expert-led approach, Gregory and associates openly and firmly 
decline participants’ autonomy in favour of a scientific deliberative design: ‘the scope of 
their role falls well short of a license to redesign the process’, ‘one should never allow 
public involvement processes to actually set policy’ (McDaniels et al., 1999, p. 499 and 
500). On this point the decision scientists and orthodox economists are united. Powe (2007, 
p. 166), an economist who reviews the practice of DMV and favours a preference 
economisation approach, believes that ‘it may be considered inappropriate for the results 
from public consultation to directly determine the policy outcomes’. The economists’ 
customary exclusion of ‘irrational’ responses also indicates a desire to protect some of the 
tenets of the neoclassical economic theory. 
An exclusive We perspective, whether utilitarian or other, is reason-blind. By 
restricting the deliberative space to considerations of public interest, the preference 
moralisation approach should be suspected for prejudging the problem at issue. The classic 
citizen-consumer dichotomy formulated by Sagoff (1988, 1998) is unhelpful for 
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understanding environmental values in terms of green consumerism. The participant 
selection strategy preferred by Brown et al. (1995) might even silence potential protest 
against this treatment. Social utilitarian approaches like Howarth and Wilson (2006) and 
James and Blamey (2005) are committed to consensus-oriented deliberation for elicitation 
of informed economic value judgments. There is, however, no reason to expect that a 
deliberative WTP generated in accordance with communicative rationality is bound to 
conform to orthodox economic constructs. 
Dietz et al.’s (2009) treatment is less restrictive than these others. They consider 
environmental valuation as asking an essentially political question that is open to various 
philosophical conceptions of values. They carefully avoid predefining the deliberative 
outcome as a utilitarian construct. Deliberative WTP is seen as ‘emerging from a social 
dialogue about, among other things, whether to define value in terms of a utilitarian calculus 
or in some other way’ (Dietz et al., 2009, p. 330). Thus the extent to which the 
value-articulating process should be framed in ways consistent with economics is an open 
question rather than taken for granted, (Niemeyer and Spash 2001; Jorgensen 2009). 
DMV can be designed to facilitate reasoned argumentation. A procedure of 
anonymous tabling of reasons was used both by Dietz et al. (2009) and by James and 
Blamey (2005). In the former, each participant wrote down a list of reasons in relation to 
global warming. They proposed one reason at a time and it was recorded and posted around 
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the meeting room visible to all. The facilitator then asked for verbal comments on the listed 
reasons and prompted discussion. The process was repeated until all reasons were discussed. 
This approach enabled orderly argumentation over all concerns raised, and free articulation 
of reasons and their revision. It placed little restriction on the types of reason and forms of 
expression, making it conducive to communicative reasoning and less manipulative than 
Gregory’s (2000) approach. The authors conclude that the deliberating individuals acted like 
policy analysts by taking more consideration of the specific policy attributes. 
In contrast, a theory of DMV would be unsustainable if it prejudges the nature of the 
outcomes according to one of its candidate values, or its implied values are exempted from 
being challenged from within the deliberation by participants. Such prejudgement means 
practitioners act as both a juror and a judge, but shift between roles at various points. When 
designing and explaining the project, they act as a juror to insert values; when defending 
this, they act as a judge to override alternative interpretations or apply exemption. While 
valuing agents are asked to reflect upon their preferences, there is little reflection on the part 
of practitioners. ‘Practitioners do not evaluate the fairness of their procedures nor examine 
whether individuals believe that their own and others WTP is relevant to their conception of 
the problem at hand.’ (Jorgensen, 2009, p. 251) The pursuit of pluralism is dubious if 
values and beliefs are led, according to the analysts’ predisposition, to converge along one 
of the first-order values that ought to be openly discussed. There is no hope for fairness by 
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unfairly expelling rivals. 
At the same time, the theory of deliberative democracy is by no means value-neutral. 
Contrary to the view that the theory is no more than a procedural ethic, it has both 
substantive and procedural elements (Gutmann and Thompson, 1996; Dryzek, 2000). 
Nevertheless, its core principles do not postulate a generalized moral end from which 
substantive operational norms could be deduced leading to a course of action in relation to 
resource allocation, nor does it define value pluralism on the basis of one of the competing 
values. In addition, the requirements of the theory are indefinitely open to rejection and 
revision where publicly reasonable (Dryzek, 2000; Gutmann and Thompson, 1996, 2004).  
 
5.2 Agreeing to Disagree: Questioning Theory 
On the premise that monetary value is inherently an economic construct, some 
practitioners appeal to the procedural benefits of public deliberation. As public deliberation 
can internalize equity issues and enhance procedural fairness, it is argued to be conducive to 
broadening the democratic basis of the economic estimation (James and Blamey, 2005; 
Wilson and Howarth, 2006). On the same premise, others endorse public (or stakeholder) 
deliberation for allowing richer and higher-quality information content to meet higher 
economic standards (Macmillan et al., 2002; Gregory, 2000; Urama and Hodge, 2006). 
Many practitioners are sympathetic to both perspectives.  
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However, the premise is a pre-reason embedded in conventional stated-preference 
approaches that the analysts believe to be true and good for society. The analysts act as if 
themselves a deliberating agent, either implicitly or explicitly, and justify the premise a 
priori to the DMV participants. Constructed as an economic institution, monetary valuation 
of public goods always concedes trading-off morality given that this notion is part of the 
norms of economics. Most importantly, this is manifested as an undemocratically justified 
and unredeemable reason. 
DMV then faces the problem of being interpreted as a first-order theory. According to 
Gutmann and Thompson (2004), each first-order theory claims to be the single theory 
capable of resolving moral conflicts, but does so by rejecting rival theories and principles. 
For these theories, moral integration is an overarching concept. They assume that citizens 
subscribe to a particular moral belief (e.g. utilitarianism) or require them to change 
accordingly. 
In contrast, deliberative democracy, as a second-order theory, is non-exclusive. 
Second-order theories are about other theories as they provide ways of dealing with the 
claims of conflicting first-order theories and govern their interaction. They make room for 
moral conflict to be resolved by some predetermined standards which do not affirm or deny 
moral principles expressed by first-order theories. Participants are required only to follow 
these standards or rules without the ends being predetermined. Thus, democratic 
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deliberation does not necessarily aim to induce citizens to change their first-order values; it 
is rather aimed at encouraging diverse value positions to live with each other even if they 
are mutually incompatible (Gutmann and Thompson, 1996).  
As far as irreducibility of plural values is concerned, a DMV framed by any first-order 
theory is doomed to failure. Deliberative democracy accepts solutions on the basis of 
reasoned differences and allows ‘workable agreements’ in which participants agree on a 
course of action for different reasons (Dryzek, 1990, 2000). An ideal deliberative process 
mediated by the principles of reciprocity should proceed with participants cultivating 
mutual respect for and recognition of each other’s ethical perspectives, provided that they 
can be justified as reasonable. Participants are not rigidly required to agree on the principles 
of the alternative perspectives in specific, but accept them, if justified, as a legitimate basis 
of decision-making. Mutuality in reasoned argumentation is crucially important to this 
endeavour. 
Incommensurability of values cannot be resolved by simply informing preferences or 
opening up the valuation process to a variety of perspectives. The theory of deliberative 
democracy entails a re-orientation of the interactive structure, and not merely of the 
substance of valuation. The epistemic status of monetary valuation has to be left open. The 
key is to downplay the privilege of any substantive value while allowing reasoned 
disagreement (Dryzek, 1990, 2000; Gutmann and Thompson, 1996, 2004). An ideal form of 
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DMV should belong to no first-order theory and generate mutual agreement reached on the 
merit of each reasonable value claim. 
 
6. A Discourse Based Approach: Redefining Money Value 
A DMV model predisposed to a particular set of motivational criteria is problematic. Under 
neoclassical economics WTP is defined as a function of expected utility change. It has to be 
redefined to reflect the pluralistic nature of the DMV project. We therefore favour a 
‘discourse based approach’, following O’Hara (1996, 2001)4. 
DMV primarily involves the individuals collectively searching for and defining an 
institution acceptable for valuing the environment in monetary terms, rather than pricing it 
under a perfectly predefined institution. Values are construed broadly as reasons raised by 
individuals to justify a course of action, and the process of valuation is akin to seeking fair 
terms of cooperation on a payment to be levied either at a group or individual level. The 
elicited deliberative WTP should be understood as a collectively bound ‘workable 
agreement’ embodying the ideal of ‘what is to be done while differing about why’ (Dryzek, 
1990, p. 43). A deliberative WTP, formed on the basis of reciprocity between two 
individuals who hold different moral beliefs, might then be influenced by at least two 
criteria: legitimacy and agreement. These are reflected in the contrast between willingness 
and approval. 
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An individual might be motivated towards a monetary agreement by their own interest, 
and/or recognition of the claim of others, in view of the legitimacy given by their cultural 
tradition and/or ethical beliefs. They might, however, still disagree in specific on the 
substantive principles held by the other. Based on mutual understanding and respect, this 
kind of agreement does not require or presume uniformity across participants or perfect 
agreement on norms (Dryzek, 1990). It merely involves sharing of subjective experiences 
(inter-subjectivity). Without subscribing or surrendering to each other’s perspectives, the 
deliberating individuals might articulate WTP as a second-order agreement, which does not 
constitute trading-off their personal moral beliefs against others’ (Gutmann and Thonpson, 
1996, p. 93). The deliberative WTP would no longer entirely represent a money payment for 
common interest, because individuals might fail to consider the other’s interest as 
acceptable in specific. It is better described as, at least partially, an ‘agreement to pay’. A 
person might be willing to pay to obtain or do something they consider as good or right. The 
evaluation could be undertaken by a solitary thinker given adequate information and a 
‘transaction’ opportunity. The idea of willingness to pay does not capture the essence of the 
deliberative ideal of inter-subjectivity, as it is primarily motivated by and ends in one’s own 
values. 
On the other hand, a person might grant agreement on behalf of those whom they 
represent for something challenging to their own personal preferences, so long as the 
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reasons are compelling. This mutual justification process cannot be carried out by solitary 
thinking, but only by an interactive process pursuing inter-subjective understanding. Unlike 
willingness, engaging in some interpersonal connection or social relationship with those 
who are the objects of mutual justification is a necessary condition for agreement. A person 
might be willing to contribute to a course of action without other people’s consent, but 
agreement always implies mutuality. The former is linked to personal interest (broadly 
defined as including utility, rights, or any other ideals considered desirable), whereas the 
latter also applies to causes outside of personal interests. An ideal deliberative WTP is 
distinguished from the conventional one by the requirement that its ethical legitimacy has to 
be validated not just in the privacy of one’s mind, but also to the acceptance of a second 
party. This means only group-determined WTP makes sense as a representation of 
democratic and pluralistic process, i.e. fair price or arbitrated WTP/WTA. 
Another property of a deliberative WTP is that its substantive meaning is envisaged as 
contextually contingent. What it means is always seen as an empirical question, rather than 
a pre-definable postulate. Pre-defining it according to standards exogenous to deliberation 
would imperil the pursuit of communicative rationality. The economic conception of values 
should be given no privilege, or the meaning would become dictated. The imperative of 
mutual justification demands that this and other conceptions be open to rejection in the 
valuation process. Participants are encouraged to bring forth a variety of values and beliefs 
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and debate them based on their merits. Which set of values will contribute to or explain the 
outcome is difficult to predict, and undesirable to prejudge. The natural dynamic is largely 
unknown prior to deliberation and all value claims have the chance of being rejected. Plus 
the context varies by case. To give a universal definition to deliberative WTP is impossible 
and unnecessary. 
Vatn’s (2005) critique, quoted earlier in this paper, is defensible if the valuation 
inquiry is entirely underwritten by a neoclassical economic framework. However, his 
arguments (see also Vatn, 2009) are weakened as communicative and economic rationalities 
are not seen as a dichotomy. Actually they are not mutually exclusive. The epistemic status 
of monetization is amenable to the rationality of the concerned VAI. Communicative 
rationality is the extent to which an action is characterized by reflective and inter-subjective 
understanding of competent actors on values, beliefs and preferences (Habermas, 1984; 
Dryzek, 1990). As an inter-subjective discourse, it does not and should not preclude 
individual citizens from exercising utility maximization rules. Rejection of the dominance 
of orthodox economics should not be conflated with rejection of economic rationalisation. 
The political ideal requires individuals to question or defend the case for monetary 
valuation, but does not by definition accept or deny it on their behalf. On these grounds 
restricting public deliberation to We perspectives and communitarian norms is indefensible. 
Valuing the environment is not inherently unacceptable provided that it is framed to 
 44
the satisfaction of this higher-order rationality. Utility maximization rules and market 
rationality could be acceptable upon mutual agreement among all the participants of a 
discursive process (Dietz, 1994). The assertion that these economic imperatives are 
invariably incompatible with the rationality of public deliberation effectively renders the 
deliberative rules exogenous to the communicative process from which political legitimacy 
is acquired, i.e. it is not legitimate on its own terms. The aim should be to regulate economic 
rationality with communicative reasoning and employ a discursive design to preclude any 
manipulative or coercive treatment privileging a particular doctrine (O’Hara, 1996; 
Söderbaum and Brown, 2010). Making the reason-giving process open, free and critical (e.g. 
Dietz et al., 2009) is normatively more appropriate than professionally ‘guiding’ it along a 
decision-scientific rationality (e.g. Gregory, 2000). The social meaning of assigning money 
value has to be set free. 
DMV is not meant to be an exclusive economic construct, nor a rights-based one. At 
least it should not be predefined as tied to any one value orientation or philosophy, 
otherwise DMV cannot address incommensurability. Deliberative institutions cannot make 
incompatible value positions compatible, but they can help them live peacefully and 
respectfully together. As an institution, DMV contributes to the assigning of social import to 
the act of valuing and the money values elicited. The assigned meanings act as terms of 
cooperation and are not fixed; they are what the deliberative institutions should seek. There 
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is no need to rigidly envisage the social act of paying always as a trade-off. 
 
7. Conclusions 
Deliberative democracy would be meaningless in a uniform society. A weak conception of 
deliberative democracy has been taken to overturn economics, or, in the case of economic 
preference construction, implicitly reinforce it. A strong deliberative democracy does neither, 
but dismantles the dominance of economics. DMV theories and experiments that privilege 
or marginalise by design any single conception of values should be held in suspicion. There 
should be more emphasis on inter-subjectivity as much as the informational content of the 
value obtained. DMV theories influenced by the critical strand of deliberative democracy do 
not simply seek the values of public goods from expressing and/or aggregating values or 
preferences. In this tradition, we argue for DMV to be re-conceptualized as a mutual 
agreement resulting from an interactive process involving the contestation of discourses. 
DMV should not be taken as an extended form of CVM to validate economic doctrine on 
the basis of informative talks. There are sufficient reasons not to marry DMV to 
neoclassical economics, nor any other single tradition. 
The enemy of deliberative economics is not neoclassicism, but hierarchy of any kind. 
Countering the limitations of neoclassical economics appears to have led to encountering 
the limitations of decision science and deontology. There are signs of granting privilege 
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beyond redeeming the excluded. As a project of broadening democracy this is not justifiable 
on its own terms. Deliberative economics as a demonstration of the political axiom ‘the 
force of the better arguments’ must make all of its contributing theories redeemable. The 
cure for the ailments of public value theory is more democratic theory – theory that is 
democratic in its production, and not only in its content. The deliberative principles apply to 
the subject of inquiry (the public or stakeholder) as well as the inquirer (researcher). 
Deliberative economics involves a critical discourse built upon a set of principles and norms 
to facilitate critical encounter and dialogue on equal footing. It requires more than a 
platform to express or reinforce viewpoints. Of more importance is the reciprocal capacity 
to recognise alternative ones.  
Committed to value pluralism, deliberative economists should be well prepared to 
change their values, judgments, theories, and assumptions in ways fundamentally different 
from their preferences. Being deliberative means the more diverse the epistemic values and 
beliefs, the more important the science of economics. Deliberative economics should refrain 
from pursuing a unity of science, an idea ultimately undermining the epistemic requirement 
for deliberation. It neither accepts any hierarchy, nor acts as an ideological cafeteria in 
which ‘anything goes’. 
A structural transformation is called for to return economics to a political economy 
addressing social conflict, a discipline able to question claims by specific interests that their 
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values are generalisable. A viable economics for public policy requires a methodological 
democratisation, demanding persistent self-critique and deconstruction of claims to truth. 
Public interest is then defined in terms of a value-articulating structure predicated upon a 
democratised science, one that theorises democratically about the political economy. A truly 
value plural economic order will only be forthcoming if unconstrained, self-critical norms 
are actively embraced. 
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Notes: 
1. A willingness-to-accept compensation could be part of the same procedure but has so 
far not been employed. In economic welfare theoretic terms this is often the more 
appropriate measure but has generally been less favoured in stated preference studies 
for what can only be described as pragmatic reasons (see Knetsch 1994). 
2. Values are incommensurable when they cannot be measured in terms of some common 
cardinal scale of units of value. Neoclassical economics assumes monetary 
commensurability. 
3. Decision aid here refers to cognitive support or guidance beyond the usual small group 
facilitating measures. 
4. ‘Discourse-based valuation’ has been adopted by Wilson and Howarth (2006) as well. 
However, as we have explained, it is presented in terms somewhat at variation with the 
idea of discursive democracy. Here we refer to O’Hara (1996, 2001) to highlight its 
theoretical root in discursive ethics. 
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